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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY BOARD OF 
EDUCATION FOR THE USE 
AND BENEFIT OF ANDERSON 
LUMBER COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
J. LOYD UNDER WOOD, 
Defendent, 
and PHOENIX INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF HARTFORD 
CONNECTICUT, a Connecticut 
corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 9113 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Anderson Lumber Company, hereinafter referred 
to as CtAnderson," plaintiff below, does not adopt the State-
ment of Facts set forth in the Brief of Phoenix Insurance 
Company of Hartford, hereinafter referred to as CtPhoenix," 
one of the defendants below. 
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The issues before the trial court in this case were issues 
of fact exclusively and were submitted to the jury in the 
form of special interrogatories. The jury answered each 
special interrogatory in favor of this respondent and the 
answer to each special interrogatory was adopted by 
the lower court. The record supports these answers and the 
Findings of Fact made by the lower court and its judgment 
should therefore be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
J. Lloyd Underwood, hereinafter referred to as ((Under-
wood," after having been engaged in the construction busi-
ness for some seven years, was awarded the contract to 
construct an addition to the South Davis Junior High School. 
(T. 49) Pursuant to statute, he obtained from Phoenix 
and paid the premium on an (tOwner's Protective Bond," 
which provided in substance that materialmen and laborers 
could collect unpaid accounts from Phoenix for labor per-
formed on and materials supplied to the construction of the 
high school. (Ex. A) 
Underwood awarded Anderson the contract for the 
mill work which would be incorporated into the high school. 
(T. 10) 
Work was commenced by Underwood in October, 1955, 
and continued thereafter to September, 1957. (T. 52, 25) 
Between the date construction commenced and May 10, 
1956, Underwood obtained materials from Anderson Lum-
ber Company which were used in the high school construc-
tion activity and the invoice price of these materials was 
charged to an account with Underwood. (T. 75) 
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During this same period of time, Underwood was en-
gaged in two other construction projects. (T. 75) Each of 
the two other jobs was also covered by a bond but it is not 
clear from the record whether both bonds were written by 
Phoenix. (T. 76) It does appear, however, to the best 
recollection of Underwood, that Phoenix had written the 
bonds on the other two jobs. (T. 76) In any event, charges 
for materials obtained from Anderson by Underwood for use 
in these other two jobs were placed in the same account with 
the purchases made by Underwood for use in the high 
school. (T. 75) One of the witnesses, Darrell Crawford, 
Anderson's account manager, in response to defendant's coun-
sel's question, as follows: 
ceQ. Well, you had $11,000 ow1ng to you 
(Anderson) on May 10?" 
Answered: 
((A. I would say on the Bountiful School." (T. 
96) 
It therefore appears that the record would support a 
finding that the account due Anderson from Underwood on 
May lOth was composed of purchases of materials, the total 
amount of which was secured by the bond here in evidence 
or by other bonds issued by Phoenix or by others. 
On or about May 10, 1956, Underwood gave Ander-
son two checks, the total amount of which paid off the bal-
ance then due in the sum of $11,485.20 and left a small 
credit balance in the account. (T. 43) 
One or two days later, Underwood testified, he went 
into Anderson's Ogden yard office and borrowed $7,300. 
(T. 73, 74) This borrowing was evidenced by a demand 
note. (T. 22, 24) The proceeds of this loan were used by 
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Underwood to provide working capital and to pay for labor 
and material performed at and supplied to the high school 
project. (T. 61) The testimony indicates that Under-
wood could have obtained this money from his bank, but he 
believed he could obtain the money from Anderson and 
made application to it. (T. 63) It is a usual business prac-
tice of Anderson to make loans to its customers engaged in 
the construction business, and such loans are frequently and 
customarily made by Anderson. (T. 22) 
The testimony of both Underwood and George Ward, 
Anderson's Ogden yard manager, establishes without con-
tradiction that the loan application was entirely initiated by 
Underwood. (T. 26, 74) Appellant's counsel has alleged in 
his brief at page 6 that Underwood testified at page 62 of the 
transcript that he could not have paid Anderson on May 10 
if Anderson had not made the loan. The transcript does not 
so recite and, in fact, indicates the exact opposite on page 62: 
Mr. Hansen: 
uQ. And in effect you couldn't have paid the 
$11,000 on the open account if you hadn't borrowed 
the $7300 back again, isn't that right? 
Mr. Underwood: 
uA. I could have, but it would have pinched me." 
(emphasis supplied) 
That is why Underwood made the loan-he was 
((pinched" for funds, but he could have gotten along without 
the money. It is well to remember that this transaction oc-
curred within about six months of the date construction was 
commenced and about eight months prior to the earliest time 
anyone-even Underwood-knew that financial difficulties 
were to later beset him. 
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As a rest1lt of the payments and the loan, Anderson had 
received payment in full for an account which had been and 
was secured by construction bonds and had replaced the 
secured account with a $7,300 loan to Underwood evidenced 
by an unsecured promissory note. 
After May 10, 1956, Underwood made further pur-
chases from Anderson for materials and Anderson supplied 
millwork pursuant to the subcontract. The last materials and 
millwork were supplied by Anderson on December 17, 1956. 
(T. 15) 
A small payment was made on the account in September, 
1956, but neither Underwood nor the employees of Ander-
son could remember contacting each other during November 
or December of 1956 nor during January of 1957. (T. 12, 
79) 
On February 4, 1957, Underwood made out a check 
to Anderson in the total sum of $10,000. On the voucher 
attached to the check he wrote in his own handwriting these 
words: 
((Please pay note and apply balance to account." (Ex. B) 
This check, with voucher attached, was then mailed by 
Underwood to Anderson. (T. 77) Upon receipt of this 
check, Anderson applied the total amount as directed, 
$7,713.66 to the amount due for principal and interest on 
the note and $2,286.34 to the amount due on the account. 
(T. 45) The same day Underwood paid Anderson, he also 
paid $6,000 to the A & B Plumbing Company and two weeks 
prior he had paid off a note at the Commercial Security Bank. 
(T. 79, 80) After making all of these payments, he still had 
approximately $20,000 in his checking account. (T. 80) 
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On or about February 19, 1957, Phoenix apparently be-
came concerned, and thereafter controlled all payments made 
out of Underwood's checking account. (T. 80) The school 
was completed to the satisfaction of the architects the fol-
lowing September, 19 57. 
The amount due Anderson was the subject of a stipula-
tion between the parties and was settled in open court at 
$11,3 2 0 .16. (R. 21 ) The issue reserved for the trial was 
whether Phoenix was entitled to an offset of the $7,713.66 
as the amount applied by Anderson at the written direction 
of Underwood to the payment of the note. (R. 61) 
As heretofore stated, the trial court disallowed the off-
set and decreed that Anderson was due the entire amount 
set forth in the stipulation. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE ANSWERS GIVEN BY THE JURY TO 
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES WHICH WERE 
ADO·PTED BY THE COURT IN ITS FINDINGS ARE 
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
A. ANDERSON DID NOT KNOW NOR DID 
IT HAVE REASON TO KNOW OF THE SOURCE 
OF FUNDS PAID TO IT BY UNDER WOOD ON 
FEBRUARY 4, 1957. 
B. UNDER WOOD DIRECTED ANDERSON TO 
APPLY THE CHECK OF FEBRUARY 4, 1957, 
FIRST TO THE NOTE AND SECOND TO THE 
ACCOUNT. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
C. THE LOAN MADE BY ANDERSON TO UN-
DERWOOD WAS BONA FIDE AND PLACED 
ANDERSON'S ACCOUNT IN AN UNSECURED 
POSITION THAT OTHER WISE WOULD HAVE 
BEEN SECURED. 
POINT II 
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES COVERED 
ALL OF THE ISSUES IN THE CASE WHICH WERE 
SUPPO·R TED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD AND THE LAW SUPPORTS THE 
PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
RELATING TO THE SECURED ACCOUNT AND 
MOTIVATION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ANSWERS GIVEN BY THE JURY TO 
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES WHICH WERE 
ADOPTED BY THE COURT IN ITS FINDINGS OF 
FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
There appears to be no conflict between the appellant 
and the respondent as to the rules of law which are applicable 
to the facts of this case. This Court has heretofore announced 
the law to be that where money is paid by a general con-
tractor to a materialman who was unaware of the source 
of the money, a surety cannot require that the money be 
applied for materials used on the bonded job. See Utah 
State Building Commission v. Great American Indemnity Co. 
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et al, 105 Utah 11, 140 P. 2d 763; and Salt Lake City v. 
O'Conner et al, 68 Utah 233,249 P. 810. Appellant has cited 
these two cases on page 21 of his brief as the controlling 
precedent. 
A. ANDERSON DID NOT KNOW NOR DID IT 
HAVE REASON TO KNOW OF THE SOURCE 
OF FUNDS PAID TO IT BY UNDERWOOD ON 
FEBRUARY 4, 1957. 
Special interrogatory number 2 was directed to the 
foregoing rule of law and made this inquiry: 
((Do you find it proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the moneys paid by Mr. Underwood to 
the Anderson Lumber Company on or about February 
4, 1957, came from the Davis County School Board 
for work done on the South Davis Junior High 
School, and further that the Anderson Lumber Com-
pany knew it came from that source?" 
To this interrogatory the jury answered uNo." (R-60) 
In support of the jury's answer, the record discloses 
that during 1956 Underwood kept all of his funds derived 
from borrowing, and from at least two other projects and 
from the high school job in a common checking account. 
There is no evidence which would indicate the source from 
which the February 4, 1957, payment to Anderson was made. 
Mr. Underwood was examined by appellant's counsel on at 
least two different occasions during the trial and was not 
even asked the source from which the funds were obtained. 
The record does not contain any evidence which would indi-
cate that any person knew where the funds used for that 
payment came from. 
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Anderson, on the other hand, conducts a substantial 
lumber and hardware business in Ogden. It was shown that 
Anderson has, on the average, approximately seven hundred 
outstanding accounts receivable and it would therefore be an 
economic illusion to expect Anderson's employees to know 
or even be charged with knowing the source from which each 
customer obtained the funds to pay each account. In fact, 
George Ward testified it would be an impossibility. (T. 36) 
It further appears from the record that the contacts 
between George Ward and Underwood occurred on in-
frequent occasions. From the latter part of November, 
1956, to February 4, 1957, Underwood had neither seen 
George Ward nor had there been correspondence between 
them nor even a phone call. 
In considering these established facts, it appears appro-
priate to cite a comment of Justice Crocket where, in affirm-
ing the lower court decision entered by Justice Wade in the 
Utah State Building case, supra, he stated: 
((It would be extremely impra.ctical for a ma-
terialman dealing with a contractor to be under the 
necessity of inquiring into the source of the money 
paid him, and equally impractical to require the ma-
terialman to apply the money to any particular job, 
unless he knew the source of it." 
Practical commerce would militate against any other 
conclusion. 
This record therefore sets forth ample evidence to sup-
port the answer of the jury and the finding of the court to 
the effect that Anderson did not know the source from 
which the payment of February 4, 1957, was made. 
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B. UNDER WOOD DIRECTED ANDERSON TO 
APPLY THE CHECK OF FEBRUARY 4, 1957, 
FIRST TO THE NOTE AND SECOND TO THE 
ACCOUNT. 
Special Interrogatory number 3 asked the jury to answer 
the following question: 
uDo you find it proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Mr. Underwood directed that the pay-
ment on or about February 4, 1957, be applied first 
to note and balance to his material account, at the time 
the payment was delivered?" 
The jury answered this interrogatory uYes." (R-60) 
The answer given and the finding made are supported 
in this record by both written evidence and oral testimony. 
Mr. Underwood made the payment of February 4, 1957, 
to Anderson in the form of a check with voucher attached. 
Written on the voucher was the direction to ccPlease pay 
note and apply balance to account." Underwood testified 
that this direction was placed upon the voucher by him in 
the sanctuary of his own home and at his own and sole 
election. The check and voucher were then mailed to 
Anderson without a prior personal conversation of any na-
ture. In the course of business, George Ward made out a 
receipt and Underwood's note and general account with 
Anderson was appropriately credited with the payment pur-
suant to the written direction on the voucher. These facts 
afford ample ground for the jury to answer affirmatively 
interrogatory number 3. 
Although it is probably superfluous to elaborate on the 
law which formed the basis for interrogatory number 3, 
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considering the fact the jury found Anderson did not have 
knowledge of the source of the funds used for the payment, 
we are nevertheless moved to state very respectable author-
ity holds that even though a materialman does in fact know 
of the source of funds paid to it by a contractor 
(( ... it could, pursuant to an understanding be-
tween the materialman and the subcontractor, apply 
the money to the extinguishment of a prior unsecured 
debt on the ground that the moneys so uncondition-
ally paid to the subcontractor became its money to 
use as its own, and that the surety had no equity in the 
money and no right to direct the applications of 
payments." See the Utah State Building Company 
case, supra, citing the case of Standard Oil Company 
v. Dayetal, 161 Minn. 281,201 N. W. 410,41 A.L.R. 
1291. See also People v. Powers, 108 Mich. 339, 66 
N. W. 215, and Cram Company v. Johnson et al, 67 
F. 2d 121. 
Consequently and by reason of the written direction given 
it, Anderson would have been entitled to retain the full pay-
ment as against Phoenix even if it had knowledge the funds 
were in fact derived from the high school job. 
Here, the jury and the trial court have found that 
Anderson did not have knowledge and that Anderson was 
directed to apply the payment as it did. Therefore, either 
finding compelled the trial court to enter its decree in 
Anderson's favor and would be supportable by the record. 
C. THE LOAN MADE BY ANDERSON TO UN-
DERWOOD WAS BONA FIDE AND PLACED 
ANDERSON'S ACCOUNT IN AN UNSECURED 
POSITION THAT OTHER WISE WOULD HAVE 
BEEN SECURED. 
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Special interrogatories numbered 4 and 5 generally asked 
if Anderson attempted to make it appear that a debt for 
materials delivered to various jobs would be insured by the 
bond and that thereafter the alleged sham loan could be 
paid without an admission that payment was being applied 
to projects other than the high school. The jury and the 
trial court found that the loan was bona fide and that there 
was no attempt made to maneuver or misapply payments. 
(R. 60-61) 
The record supports the answer of the Jury and the 
finding of the court. 
1. The Loan. 
On May 10, 1956, the Anderson account with Under-
wood was composed of charges for materials supplied to 
the high school and to two other jobs.1 The high school job 
was bonded with Phoenix under the bond here in evidence 
and the other two jobs were bonded either with Phoenix or 
other bonding companies.2 Consequently, the May, 1956 
account was secure insofar as Anderson was concerned. On 
approximately May 10, 1956, Underwood paid the then 
outstanding secured account. About two days later, he 
testified, he borrowed $7300 from Anderson to be used by 
him in the high school project. After the money had been 
loaned to Underwood, Anderson held an unsecured promis-
sory note and had relinquished a fully bonded and secured 
open account-and an account which probably would have 
been secured by the bonds of this appellant. These facts 
are reasonably established by this record. 
IMr. Crawford's testimony indicated the account was made up of only 
charges for materials supplied to the high school. 
2Underwood's best recollection was that both of the other jobs were bonded 
with Phoenix. 
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If a sham loan were to be made by a business man to 
bring an account under a bond, would a fully secured and 
bonded account be relinquished? Would such a manipula-
tion be attempted merely to jeopardize the eventual pay-
ment of an account? What advantage could possible be 
obtained by either party where the account paid off is a bonded 
account? The answer to these questions must necessarily 
be that businessmen do not commit fraud or conspire with 
others to imperil an existing secure account in the hope that 
at some future date they can restore themselves to their 
original position. 
The circumstances existing at the time the loan to 
Underwood was made further indicate the high school con-
struction was proceeding as planned. It wasn't until nine 
or ten months after May, 1956, that the first rumblings of 
financial doom were heard. The record further indicates 
that the proceeds of the loan were used by Underwood to 
discharge obligations to laborers engaged in the high school 
construction activity and therefore the loan indirectly de-
creased the obligation of Phoenix. 
All of the facts existing at the time of the loan militate 
against concluding that a sham loan was entered into, and 
support the findings of the court and jury. 
2. The Payment. 
The remaining question is whether the record supports 
the answer of the jury and the finding of the court that 
there was no manipulation of payments. 
It will be remembered that $10,000 was paid by Under-
wood to Anderson on February 4, 1956. At the same time, 
Underwood paid the plumbing contractor and a short time 
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previous had paid off a loan to an Ogden Bank. The $10,000 
payment to Anderson did not even pay half of the outstand-
ing obligation then due and there remained on the account 
after application of the payment an amount slightly in excess 
of $12,000. Underwood, after all of the above payments 
had been made, had remaining in his bank account approxi-
mately $20,000. 
Insofar as George Ward was concerned, Underwood oc-
cupied only the status of a customer and was served pursuant 
to the usual business practice of Anderson. Both George Ward 
and Underwood testified that neither had seen the other nor 
talked to nor corresponded with the other from the latter 
part of November, 1956, until after the payment of February 
4, 1957, had been made. 
The payment of that date was made by check, filled 
out in Underwood's home with directions written thereon 
in his own handwriting, which directions were decided upon 
by his own independent election. The check and voucher 
were deposited in the mail and duly received thereafter by 
George Ward. This record is patently silent that Anderson 
participated or influenced in any manner the actions and 
decisions of Underwood in effecting the payment in the 
foregoing manner. If deception or manipulation were con-
templated through this payment by Underwood, Anderson 
should not be charged therewith, and if Underwood con-
templated a deception or manipulation or even attempted 
to prefer Anderson over other creditors, why would he pay 
less than one-half of his account when ample funds existed 
to pay the entire balance? Further, Underwood was under 
the impression at the time the payment was made that this 
loan, the proceeds from which were used in the high school 
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project, was covered by the bond. 3 That impression would 
be reasonable. 
Upon these adduced facts, the answers of the jury and 
the findings of the court that the loan was bona fide and that 
there was no attempt to manipulate payments are reasonable 
and supportable. 
There is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the answers given by the jury to the special interrogations. 
This court has recently stated: 
((However, as we have indicated many times, in 
reviewing the facts in a case like this, we must do so 
in a light that most strongly supports the verdict, 
and we must go along with the verdict unless it 
clearly is not supported by any substantial evidence." 
See Dairy Distributor v. Local Union 976, 8 Utah 2d 
124, 329 P. 2d 414. 
POINT II 
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES COVERED 
ALL OF THE ISSUES IN THE CASE WHICH WERE 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Defendant Phoenix, was not entitled to have its theory 
of the case presented to the jury unless the evidence would 
justify reasonable men to follow its theory. See Beckstrom v. 
Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210, 282 P. 2d 309. Phoenix contends 
that the interrogatories submitted to the jury were so restric-
tive as not to cover the ((ultimate" issue of whether Anderson 
and Underwood undertook to defraud Phoenix. The evi-
3The issue of whether a construction loan is included within the cover-
age of a bond has been the subject of some litigation. See cases cited at 127 
A.L.R. 974; and Tolton Investment Co. vs. Maryland' Casualty, 77 Utah 226 
293 p 611. ' 
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dence presented by the parties to this action centered.around 
three transactions between Underwood and Anderson. The 
first occurred about May 10, 1956, when Underwood paid 
his account with Anderson and the second occurred approxi-
mately two days later when Underwood borrowed $7300 
evidenced by his promissory note. The third occurred on 
February 4, 1957, when Underwood mailed to Anderson his 
check for $10,000. If any conspiracy had been attempted, 
the concerted action would have to have occurred either as 
an incident of the loan transaction in May, 1956, or the pay-
ment transa.ction in February, 1957, or both. 
Interrogatory 4 presented to the jury the question of 
Anderson's motivation in making the loan to Underwood. 
Interrogatory 5 presented to the jury the question of whether 
the loan was used as a device to apply monies received from 
Underwood to accounts for materials used in projects other 
than the high school. The evidence presented by the de-
fendant to support his theory was, at best, entirely circum-
stantial. 
Insofar as this record is concerned, the facts surround-
ing the loan and the facts surrounding the payment of Feb-
ruary, 1957, are only consistent with bona fide acts of 
businessmen engaged in regular and normal and lawful 
commerce. 
It would seem that Phoenix would have been shouldered 
with the burden of making some affirmative showing sup-
porting its theory of the case to have been entitled to inter-
rogatories 4 and 5, but here there was none. Phoenix even 
failed to produce evidence whereby Anderson or Underwood 
would have obtained an advantage motivating a so-called 
ccsham loan" or a Hmanipulation" of payments. Ultimately, 
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a distinct disadvantage and risk beset Anderson by reason 
of the loan. It certainly should be added that if this record 
would support a ((fraud" or ((conspiracy" instruction or 
interrogatory, then any payment made by a contractor to a 
materialman during the period bonded construction was 
proceeding could be attacked and recoupment sought in a 
court of law under a broad, nebulous and general instruc-
tion of ((fraud" or ((conspiracy." As heretofore stated, the 
law only permits instructions to be given jurors if the record 
supports the instructions requested. 
Appellant's brief appears to request that in view of the 
fact that the court and jury has found against it on the only 
three questioned acts of the parties, it should now be allowed 
a broad general instruction unrelated to the record, unrelated 
to those transactions and unrelated to any other event. Such 
an instruction would give the jury pure license to speculate 
without relating their deliberations to the evidence. 
In Finney v. Finney, 164 S. W. 2d 263 (Texas 1942) an 
action was brought to recover an interest in realty conveyed 
by plaintiff to defendant on the ground that the conveyances 
were induced by the fraud of the defendant. The Court of 
Civil Appeals of Texas stated: 
((We further suggest that it is not proper to sub-
mit an issue of false and fraudulent statements and 
representations in general terms." 
((The proper way is to submit the substance of 
the statement or representation, that is to say, ask the 
jury if the particular statement or representation 
were made, whether it was true or false and whether 
or not it was relied upon in doing the act or thing 
pleaded as induced by it wrongfully." 
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In McMurdie vs. Underwood, 346 P. 2d 711 (Utah 
1959) this court stated that a refusal to give requested in-
structions was not error where the basic issues were fairly 
and intelligibly presented to the jury by the instructions 
g1ven. 
Plaintiff submits that in this case the proper way to 
present appellant's theory to the jury was to associate the 
theory to the loan transaction and to the payment transaction. 
This the court did with interrogatories 4 and 5. In view of 
the evidence adduced at the trial any other interrogatory 
would have been improper and not supported by the evi-
dence. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD AND THE LAW SUPPORTS THE 
PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
RELATING TO THE SECURED ACCOUNT AND 
MOTIVATION. 
Appellant's pleaded defense to the claim of Anderson 
was that of fraud and conspiracy. In order to meet this 
defense, Anderson proved that its transactions with Under-
wood had been bona fide and in complete good faith. 
The Texas Civil Appeals Court has said: 
HWhenever issues of fraud and good faith are 
raised, the evidence must take a rather wide range 
and may embrace all the facts and circumstances 
which go to make up the transaction, disclose its true 
character, explain the acts of the parties and throw 
light on their objects and intentions." See Blanton v. 
Sherman Compress Co., 256 S. W. 2d 8 84, 20 Am Jr. 
320. 
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Here, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, 
permitted the parties to introduce evidence supporting their 
theories of the case. Plaintiff, in attempting to prove its 
good faith throughout its course of dealings with Underwo~d 
and the bonding company, showed: 
1. That the account due Anderson as of May 10, 1956, 
consisted in part of the materials which had been 
supplied to the high school job; 
2. That the account due Anderson as of May 10, 1956, 
consisted of materials which had been supplied to 
bonded jobs; 
3. That the $7300 loan was used to pay labor and 
other costs incident to the high school job. 
If Anderson and Underwood had conspired to defraud 
the bonding company, why did Underwood pay his account 
as of May 10, 1956, which consisted in part of materials 
supplied to the high school project? If there was a con-
spiracy to defraud the bonding company, why did An-
derson permit Underwood to pay an account which 
consisted of materials supplied to bonded jobs and make him 
a construction loan evidenced by an unsecured note? If there 
was a conspiracy to defraud the bonding company, why did 
Anderson make a loan to Underwood when it knew the 
money was going to be used to meet the payroll on the high 
school job? The evidence adduced by the plaintiff was to 
show the good faith of Anderson and Underwood. The 
evidence supporting plaintiff's theories was admitted by the 
trial court to show what motivated Anderson in its trans-
actions with Underwood. 
Plaintiff's counsel properly argued its theories and the 
evidence in support thereof to the jury. In Joseph v. W. H. 
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Groves, L.D.S. Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P. 2d 330, this 
court said: 
((Counsel of plaintiff in argument to the jury 
should be permitted to refer to and use all of the 
competent evidence he has marshalled and presented 
at the trial and to explain its meaning and argue its 
significance to his client's cause." 
The portions of counsel's argument objected to by ap-
pellant in its brief fall precisely within the foregoing rule. 
I. Argument That Other Jobs Were Bonded. 
We have heretofore set forth ample record citations to 
demonstrate that the record would support a finding that 
all of the jobs to which materials were supplied by Anderson, 
and which composed the account existing May 10, 1956, were 
bonded jobs and that Underwood's best recollection was 
that the bonds were placed with this appellant. Further, we 
have heretofore set forth ample record citations to show 
that the May 10, 1956, account was composed of purchases, 
in part, if not wholly, supplied to the high school job-
the precise job appellant's bond here covered. Consequently, 
the record supports an argument calculated to show: 
a. No ((sham loan" existed. 
b. That Anderson's May 10, 1956, account with 
Underwood was fully secured. 
c. That if that account was not secured, then Ander-
son was without security for the final account. 
d. That the note was unsecured and not covered by 
any bond. 
Respondent was required to ·argue these facts to rebut 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
appellant's theories and further to demonstrate to the jury 
that appellant was wrong in saying in its closing argument 
that the May 10, 1956, account was unsecured (T. 145); 
and that Anderson, by making the loan, thought it was 
transferring an unsecured indebtedness to a secured indebted-
ness. (T. 148) 
That portion of the argument objected to in Appellant's 
brief is supported by the record and is proper rebuttal to the 
argument made by counsel for Phoenix. 
2. Motivation of Anderson. 
Appellant has quoted a portion of the argument made 
by counsel for Anderson reported on page 162 of the trans-
cript. An objection was made by Mr. Hansen that argu-
ment was being made outside the record. No specific 
reference to the evidence objected to was made. Ander-
son's counsel then continued argument attempting to show 
that there could be no motivation on the part of Anderson 
to wrongfully take funds from Phoenix through the device 
of the loan, because the proceeds were used by Underwood 
to pay laborers on the high school job-the very liability 
Phoenix was obligated contingently under its bond to pay. 
Consequently, the indirect effect of the loan to Underwood 
was to afford a benefit to Phoenix through funds supplied 
by Anderson. This argument on Anderson's motive was 
made to refute the persistent assertions by counsel for 
Phoenix that Anderson had attempted to defraud Phoenix. 
The record supports this argument and counsel for Ander-
son would have been derelict in his obligation to his client 
to have ignored such evidence. 
Reference to a ((pretrial order" often made by appellant 
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as the basis for excluding argument and evidence is some-
what perplexing for the reason that this record does not 
contain, nor do we recall that the court ever entered, such 
an order. 
CONCLUSION 
There appears to be no significant issue of law in this 
case. Appellant has composed a brief in which it argues 
circumstantial evidence. The record, refutes the conclusions 
desired by appellant and contains affirmative documentary 
and oral testimony amply supporting the findings arrived 
at by the jury and the court. 
What Phoenix appears to really desire is to have this 
Court over-rule in substance, but not in form, the rules 
established by the O'Conner case, supra, and the Utah State 
Building case, supra, and in lieu of those cases adopt a theory 
which would impress an equity in favor of the carrier on all 
funds paid by Davis County School District, regardless of 
the lawful purposes to which such funds are devoted. This 
Court has aptly refuted such a doctrine and in the O'Conner 
case, supra, it quoted the Standard Oil Co. case, supra, as 
follows: 
uThe creditor should not, in the collection of his 
money, be burdened with the responsibility of having 
to know the status of his debtor's accounts nor the 
status of the obligation of the surety of the debtor. 
The surety in modern business should be, and usually 
is, quite able to care for itself. It selects those for 
whom it becomes surety. Most contractors and sub-
contractors must necessarily use some of their money 
that they receive in payment of obligations not in-
curred in the particular contract from which their 
money is received. When they receive their money 
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unconditionally, it is their own and they may do with 
it as they please. If a creditor must stop, before he 
accepts payments from his debtor, and make the 
impertinent inquiry as to his standing with his surety, 
the unsatisfactory results are obvious." 
This case demonstrates the wisdom of such a rule and the 
decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
C. PRESTON ALLEN and 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Anderson Lumber Co. 
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